

Nonlinear models of intermittent dynamics

Presented by Tingting Wang

Based on Vince Daryl, Chapter 4, Towards a Theory of
Autonomous, Optimizing Agent, PHD thesis,
Department of Economics, Harvard University, June
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Available at:

<http://www.santafe.edu/~vince/pub/dissertation.pdf>

Introduction

- ★ Two types of non-linear analysis to the models in Chapter 3:
 - Predictive choice process used by each agent.
 - Complicated dynamics
 - Investigate and prove: chaos and strange attractors
 - Analyze predictors in high dimensionality
 - Statistical physics – to demonstrate different regimes of behaviors

Summary of analysis(1)

- ✦ Systems, in which each agent adaptively searches for a good model of its environment, exhibit persistent dynamics, cyclic oscillations between low and high complexity states.
- ✦ Two assumptions:
 - ✦ Dispersed Interaction: The action of any given agent depends upon:
 - Anticipated actions of other limited agents
 - Aggregate state of these agents
 - ✦ Continual Adaptation: behaviors, actions, strategies, and products are revised based on experiences.

Summary of analysis(2)

- ✦ Analytical goals: to understand
 - ✦ the process which causes the coordination between agents' strategies
 - ✦ The meta-stable equilibrium which leads to complex oscillatory dynamics
- ✦ Two approaches:
 - ✦ Adaptively rational agents
 - ✦ Statistical physics

Basic equations

- ★ Assume we have a market with a single product. Let the price at time t be p_t .
- ★ Both supply and demand curves are linear functions of the price:
- ★ Supply: $S(p) = bp$
- ★ Demand: $D(p) = A - Bp$
- ★ p^* is the unique steady state equilibrium:
 $S(p^*) = D(p^*)$

An ARED model

Consider the state of the system in its transition from date $t-1$ to date t :

- Using model j , at time $t-1$, quantity $S_{j,t} = bH_{j,t} = bp_{j,t}^e$
 $p_{j,t}^e$ means the expected price of model j at time t
- Hence the total supply is : $S = \sum_j n_{j,t-1} S_{j,t}$
- The utility of each model $U_{j,t}(p_t, S_{j,t})$ can not be directly observed
- Agents observed utilities $\tilde{U}_j = U_j + \tilde{\epsilon}_j$. The probability using model j is:
$$\text{Prob}(j) = \frac{\exp \beta U_{j,t}}{\sum_j \exp \beta U_{j,t}}$$
- The fraction of agents using model j is:
$$n_{j,t} = \frac{\exp \beta U_{j,t}}{\sum_j \exp \beta U_{j,t}}$$

Modifications to the ARED model

- ★ To observe the details of the dynamical process, the ARED model is extended to include a system inertia. That is, at each date t , each agent makes an adjustment to its model with probability: λ , so with $1 - \lambda$, agents retain its old model. So the fraction of agents are:

$$n_{j,t} = (1 - \lambda)n_{j,t-1} + \lambda \frac{\exp \beta U_j}{Z},$$

where Z is a usual normalizing term.

- ★ Some analysis:
 - ★ Small $\lambda \rightarrow$ system has high inertia: small numbers of agents may change their model
 - ★ If $\lambda \approx 1$, system is fluid, changes in population occur instantaneously.

Simplify the model

- ★ We consider a model with 2 predictors: H_1 and H_2 . Let $m_t = n_{1,t} - n_{2,t}$, and assume:
 - ★ H_1 is a more sophisticated predictor, and charge costs $C \geq 0$.
 - ★ H_2 is free.
- ★ So we have:

$$p_{t+1} = -\frac{b}{2B} \{(1 + m_t)H_1(p_t, \dots) + (1 - m_t)H_2(p_t, \dots)\}$$

Simple short memory predictors

- ☀ Let $H_1 = p^* = 0$, $H_2 = p_t$. That means, some agents know that the equilibrium price is 0, but they need to pay a cost C , the others predict that today's price will be the same as yesterday's price. So the update map is :

$$\begin{aligned} p_{t+1} &= f(p_t, m_t) = -\frac{b}{2B} (1 - m_t) p_t \\ m_{t+1} &= g_\beta(p_t, m_t) = (1 - \lambda)m_t + \lambda \\ &\quad \times \tanh \frac{\beta}{2} \left\{ \left(\frac{b}{B} [1 - m_t] + 1 \right) p_t^2 - C \right\} \end{aligned}$$






Figure 4.1: The attracting set, $\lambda = 0.15$. The horizontal axis is price, and the vertical axis the population fraction difference m , defined in the text. Since $m = \pm 1$ are the only states in which all agents use the same predictor, the attracting set represents a complex, fluctuating balance between the two predictors, with neither having an overwhelming advantage.



(a) $\lambda = 0.95$



(b) $\lambda = 0.15$


Figure 4.2: Price timeseries. The equilibrium price has been arbitrarily fixed at zero.

Why use these simple models?

- ✱ Many properties of this simple model appear to be followed by more complicate predictors
- ✱ It exhibit the same dynamics as the more reasonable pairs of predictors we examine later, and the reasons are the same
- ✱ Strong empirical similarities dynamics and mechanisms which drive the dynamics.
- ✱ Root idea:
 - If all agents use H_1 , then this drives the system to equilibrium, then H_2 is effective too;
 - So agents switch to cheaper model H_2 .
 - Then system becomes unstable and fluctuate, which will encourage agents switch back to H_1
 - This analysis provides analytical insights into the characteristics of the predictors.


Some results for this model(1)

- ✦ The shape of unstable manifolds for $\beta = \infty$, which means ‘unboundedly rational’.




Some results of this model(2)


- There exists significant parameter ranges, with $\lambda_c < \lambda < 1$, for which a horseshoe map exists.



(a) $\lambda = 0.95$



(b) $\lambda = 0.55$



(c) $\lambda = 0.15$

Figure 4.4: The unstable manifold of the unique equilibrium point for varying λ , and $\beta = \infty$. Other parameters are: $b = 1.35$, $B = 0.5$, $C = 1$. The horizontal axis represents the price p , and the vertical axis the model proportion $m \in [-1, 1]$. These trajectories are calculated exactly using the results of Theorem 1.

To be continued

- ✦ This presentation is just a part of Chapter 4. Further analysis and more complicate models will be introduced.
- ✦ What we should learn is the analytical method, from simple to complicate, from ideal to realistic.